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NOTES
PROXIMATE CAUSE UNDER THE JONES ACT
The Jones Act,' enacted by Congress in 1920, provides a right of action against
the employers of seamen killed or injured in the course of their employment. An
election is given to the seaman or his representative between an action at law,
with trial by jury, and a suit in admiralty, tried to the court. The standards of
liability to be applied in such an action are not set forth; instead the Federal
Employers' Liability Act 2 is incorporated by reference. The FELA provides for
recovery by the employees of an interstate carrier by rail for injuries resulting
"inwhole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees
"
of such carrier
From its inception the Jones Act has been treated by the courts as remedial
legislation, to be liberally construed in favor of the injured seaman.- This attitude
has resulted in a broadened definition of negligence, 5 and an extension of the
employer's liability to lands of harm not generally compensable at common law.6
For the past decade the emphasis has been on causation, with the result that a
number of courts7 1n FELA and Jones Act cases have fundamentally departed from
the common law concept of proximate cause. The purpose of this note is to explore
the nature and extent of this departure.
Proximate, or "legal,"8 cause embraces two distinct problems. The first is the
problem of causation in fact, which deals with the part actually played by the
defendant's negligence in producing the plamtiffs injury. The second, and much
more difficult, problem is that of determining when a negligent defendant should
be relieved of liability for the harm he has in fact caused. The two problems have
little affinity and must, therefore, be considered separately.
Causation in Fact
A defendant, no matter how negligent, can be liable only when his conduct
has in fact been a cause of the damage in question. This issue of causal connection
is basically a simple one, a matter of common experience which the jury is well
suited to handle.9 The only questions of law involved concern, frst, the amount of
141 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964).
235 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1964).
835 Stat. 65 (1908), 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1964).
4
See The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S. 110, 123, 1936 A.M.C. 627, 634 (1936);
Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, 287 U.S. 367, 1933 A.M.C. 9 (1932); Storgard v.
France & Canada S.S. Corp., 263 Fed. 545, 547 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 252 U.S. 585
(1920).
5Jamison v. Encarnacion, 281 U.S. 635, 1930 A.M.C. 1129 (1930) (assault on
seaman by superior is "negligence").
0See Zanca v. Delta S.S. Lines, 246 F Supp. 127 (E.D. La. 1965) (mental sufferrag). Compare PlossEa, ToRTS § 55, at 348 (3d ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as Prosser].
7E.g., Ammar v. American Export Lines, 326 F.2d 955, 1964 A.M.C. 631 (2d Cir.
1964); DeLima v. Tnmdad Corp., 302 F.2d 585, 588, 1962 A.M.C. 2346, 2349 (2d
Cir. 1962).
8
BESTATEmENT (SEcoiND), TouTs §§ 430-31 (1965).
9 See GREEN, RATIONALE OF PRoxnv&TE CAUSE 139 1927).
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proof required of the plaintiff in order to justify submission of his case to the jury,
and second, the formula by wich the jurors are to determine the issue of causation
once it is in their hands. With respect to both questions there has been in Jones
Act and FELA cases an abandonment of settled common law principles.
Sufficzency of the Evidence
At common law the plaintiff has the burden of proving that it is more probable
than not that the defendant made a substantial contribution to his injury. 10 The
balance of probabilities must weigh in his favor. The jury is not permitted to
speculate, and if it is just as likely that causation is lacking, the defendant is
entitled to a directed verdict." A few early Jones Act cases rigorously applied this
rule,' 2 but before long a more liberal tendency developed which insisted upon less
proof and permitted more speculation by a usually sympathetic jury.' 3 When a
seaman elected to sue in admiralty, without a jury, a rule was developed that
permitted the court to infer much that was lacking on the issue of causation. 14
This liberal approach to causation in Jones Act cases was due more to the
generally sympathetic attitude of the courts toward seamen than to the statute's
incorporation of the FELA.'5 Then in Schultz v. Pennsylvania R.R.10 the United
States Supreme Court shifted the emphasis to the peculiar language of the FELA,
which provides for recovery by railway employees for injuries resulting "in whole
or in part" from employer negligence. The Court found in this provision a congressional intent to relax the employee's burden of proof on the issue of causation. A
year after Schultz the Supreme Court reiterated this position in Rogers v. Missouri
Pac. R.R.,' 7 an FELA case which has become the leading case on causation under
both the Jones Act and the FELA. Rogers was a railroad worker who was injured
while seeking to escape from a dangerous situation allegedly created by the
10 Kramer Service, Inc. v. Wilkms, 184 Miss. 483, 186 So. 625 (1939); see
PossER § 41, at 245.
11 An exception to the rule has been recognized where the plaintiff has proved the
negligence of two or more defendants, and that one of them caused his injury. In this
situation several courts have put the burden of proof on the issue of causation on the
negligent defendants. See Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948), annot.,
5 A.L.R.2d
91 (1949); PnossER § 41, at 247.
12

Miller v. Lykes Bros.-Ripley S.S. Co., 98 F.2d 185, 1937 A.M.C. 1549 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 305 U.S. 641 (1938); Lapp v. Pennsylvama R.R., 51 F.2d 477 (3d Cir.

1931).
'1 Roth v. Bird, 239 F.2d 257, 1957 A.M.C. 112 (5th Cir. 1956); Hams v. Pennsylvania R.R., 50 F.2d 866, 1931 A.M.C. 1303 (4th Cir. 1931); Grant v. United States
Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp., 22 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1927); Zinnel v. United

States Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp., 10 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1925); Cortes v.
Baltimore Insular Line, 6 F Supp. 604, 1934 A.M.C. 837 (S.D.N.Y. 1934).
14See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 46, 1948 A.M.C. 218 (1948); Gardner
v. National Bulk Carriers, Inc., 310 F.2d 284, 1963 A.M.C. 29 (4th Cir. 1962), annot.,
91 A.L.R.2d 1023 (1963); Davis v. Parkhill-Goodloe Co., 302 F.2d 489, 1962 A.M.C.
1720 (5th Cir. 1962); Admiral Towing Co. v. Woolen, 290 F.2d 641, 1961 A.M.C.
2333 (9th Cir. 1961); Kirmcich v. Standard Dredging Co., 112 F.2d 163, 1940 A.M.C.
868 (3d Cir. 1940), reversing 27 F Supp. 219, 1939 A.M.C. 165 (D.N.J. 1939).
'5 See, e.g., Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, 6 F Supp. 604, 1934 A.M.C. 837
(S.D.N.Y. 1934).
16 350 U.S. 523, 1956 A.M.C. 737 (1956).
17 352 U.S. 500 (1957).
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negligence of his foreman. The Missouri Supreme Court reversed a judgment in
his favor, partly on the ground that from the evidence it appeared at least equally
probable that the plaintiff had created the emergency by is own inattention to
his duties, and therefore there was no case for the jury. In reversing this Missouri
holding the United States Supreme Court made it crystal clear that the common
law rule with respect to the sufficiency of the evidence of causation has no place
in the FELA.

Under this statute the test of a jury case is simply whether the proofs justify with
reason the conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the slightest,
in producing the injury or death
It does not matter that, from the evidence,
the jury may also with reason, on grounds of probability, attribute the result to
other causes, including the employee's contributory negligence. Judicial appraisal
of the proofs to determine whether a jury question is presented is narrowly
limited to the single inquiry whether, with reason, the conclusion may be drawn
that negligence of the employer played any part at all in the injury or death.' 8
This test has been applied in a number of subsequent FELA and Jones Act
cases, 19 and it is now quoted as a matter of course in almost every case arising
under these statutes. It has reduced the plaintiffs burden of proof on the issue of
causation almost to the vanishing point, and as a result it is a rare court that takes
20
a case away from the jury.
The "Test" of Causation
The second problem arises after it is determined that the plaintiff's proofs
justify submission of the issue of causation in fact to the jury. This problem involves
the formula by which the issue is to be decided. How great must be the part
played by the defendant's negligence in producing the plaintiff's injury for it to
be deemed a cause thereof? The common law answer to ths question is probably no
more than a statement of the average juror's conception of causation, based on
everyday experience. The traditional rule is that the defendant's negligence must
be a cause sine qua non-a factor without which the harm would not have
occurred. 21 The conduct in question may have played some trivial part in the
occurrence, but if without it the result would have been the same, the requisite
causation is lacking, and there is no liability.

There is one situation in which this traditional formula breaks down. This is
where two forces of independent origin, either of which would alone have produced
the damage, combine to bring it about.2 2 Here, without either force the result

would have been the same, and thus by the traditional formula neither is a cause.
To meet this situation a different rule was developed, that the defendant's
18 Id.at 506-507.
19 E.g., Galick v. Baltimore &O.R.R., 372 U.S. 108 (1963) (FELA); Villaneuva v.
Califorma Tanker Co., 187 F Supp. 591 (D.N.J. 1960) (Jones Act).
20 The plaintiff must, however, have at least some circumstantial evidence to justify
an inference of causation. See Miller v. Farrell Lines, 247 F.2d 503, 1957 A.M.C. 2015
(2d Cir. 1957), cert. dented, 355 U.S. 912 (1957), whch held that even by the Rogers
test, the plaintiff had failed to carry his burden on this issue. When a seaman elects to
sue his employer in admiralty the judge's finding of no causation is protected on appeal
by the "clearly erroneous" rule [FED.R. Crv. P. 52(a)]. Prendis v. Central Gulf S.S. Co.,
330 F.2d 893 (4th Cir. 1963).
21 PNossxi

22 Id.at

§ 41, at 242-43.
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23
negligence is a cause if it is a "substantial factor" m producing the result. Since
this substantial factor test has certain other relatively minor advantages over the
25
sine qua non rule,24 it has been adopted by the Second Restatement of Torts as
the formula for determining the issue of causation in fact. Except in the one rather
unusual situation outlined above, however, the two tests are generally thought to
convey to26the jury the same idea: the defendant must play a material part in the
outcome.
27
A few courts have apparently interpreted Rogers V. Missouri Fac. R.R. as
28
leaving intact these common law formulas in FELA and Jones Act cases. Since
the rule of the Rogers case was formulated as "the test of a jury case," they have
reasoned that once it is met the issue must go to the jury, but in deciding it the
jury may still utilize the common law formulas. The great majority of the lower
federal and state courts to consider the question have rejected this view and held
that the plaintiff is entitled to a jury instruction that the employer's negligence was
29
a cause of his injury if it played "any part, even the slightest" in the occurrence.
This appears to be the correct interpretation of the Rogers case. While it is true
23

Anderson v. St. Paul & S.S.M.R.R., 146 Minn. 430, 179 N.W 45 (1920).

24 See Pnossmi § 41, at 244. Chief among these advantages is that it serves, more

clearly than the sine qua non formula, to exclude the defendant's conduct as a cause
where he has made a real, but clearly insignificant contribution to the result. Prosser gives
the example of the man who carelessly tosses a lighted match into a raging forest fire.
2 5
RESTATEmENT (SEcOND), TonTs § 431 (1965).
2
0 PRossER § 41, at 244.
27352 U.S. 500 (1957).
28 This seems to be the view taken inthe Ninth Circuit. See Bertrand v. Southern
Pac. Co., 282 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 816 (1960), where the
court approved a traditional instruction on causation. The one requested by the plaintiff,
however, stated the Rogers rule as the "test of liability," and the court objected to this
phraseology. Compare McEwen v. Spokane Intl R.R., 325 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1963).
29 Page v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry., 312 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1963), Annot., 98
A.L.R.2d 639 (1964Y; DeLima v. Trinidad Corp., 302 F.2d 585, 1962 A.M.C. 2346 (2d
Cir. 1962); Vareltis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 258 F.2d 78, 1958 A.M.C. 1848 (2d Cir.
1958); Hoyt v. Central R.R., 243 F.2d 840 (3d Cir. 1957); Domeracki v. Gulf Oil Corp.,
202 F Supp. 89, 1965 A.M.C. 1476 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (but any error in the instruction
given corrected in later parts of the charge); Villaneuva v. California Tanker Co., 187
F Supp. 591 (D.N.J. 1960); Strobel v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R., 255 Minn. 201, 96
N.W.2d 195 (1959); Missoun-Kan.-Tex. R.R. v. Franks, 379 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1964) (judgment for employee reversed on other grounds); Missoun-Kan.-Tex.
R.R. v. Shelton, 383 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964) (but traditional causation
instruction held proper on the issue of plaintiff's contributory negligence); Continental
Oil Co. v. Lindley, 382 S.W.2d 296, 1965 A.M.C. 989 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964). Compare
Morrison v. New York Cent. R.R., 361 F.2d 319 (6th Cir. 1966), where the giving of
a traditional instruction was held not to be "clear error" when the plaintiff failed to
make a timely objection. The instructions suggested by Judge William Mathes (U.S.
Dist. Judge for the Southern District of California) state the Rogers test. See MA.aEs &
DFvrrr, FEDERAL JuRY PRACTICE & INsTRUCTIONs, § 84.12 (1965); Mathes, Jury Instructions & Forms for Federal Civil Cases, 28 F.R.D. 401, 497 (1962). On the question of
whether the Rogers test should be applied to the employee's contributory negligence, see
generally Legal Cause, Proximate Cause and Comparative Negligence in the FELA, 18
STA. L. REv. 929 (1966).
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that the United States Supreme Court framed its rule in terms of the test of a jury
case, the opinion leaves little doubt that it was intended to serve as the test of
causation as well.30
Thus in the area of causation in fact there has indeed been a striking departure
from the common law. Under the Rogers rule the defendant's negligence need not
be a substantial factor, nor one without wluch the harm would not have occurred.
It is a "cause" if it played even the slightest part in the injury or death, and if
there is any evidence at all to support such a conclusion, the issue is always for the
jury.
Proximate Cause
The consequences of an act may be infinite in number and variety, while the
act itself may be but a slight departure from the standard of conduct imposed by
law. For this reason the common law has always recognized that a defendant's
liability must be limited to those consequences which bear some reasonable relation to his wrong. 3 ' Here the concern is not with the part played by the defendant's negligence in producing the plaintiff's injury. This problem of proximate
cause is properly reached only when it is established that the defendant's contribution to the damage in question was sufficiently material for a causal connection to
exist between them.
Writers have long debated the proper approach to this problem, but all have
agreed that it is one of policy.32 Reduced to its simplest terms, the question in
every case is the same: between a defendant who has been negligent and a plaintiff who has been harmed as a result, upon whom should the loss be placed? The
answer calls for a delicate balancing of individual and social interests. Rigid rules
have proved unworkable in an area dominated by considerations of policy, but the
law requires some degree of predictability. So the common law has evolved general
guidelines for determining what is "proxiate" and what is "remote." These
standards are themselves so wrapped in controversy that it is difficult to compare
and contrast them with the standards employed in Jones Act and FELA cases.
Yet there have in recent years been some departures from the prevailing common
law gtudelines, and the remainder of this section is an attempt to delineate the
nature and scope of this departure. Since its genesis is to be found in decisions of
the United States Supreme Court, it is important to inquire first what this Court
has done with the subject.
The Supreme Court and Jones Act Proximate Cause
Rogers v. Missourz Fac. R.R. 33 dealt with the problem of causation in fact.
The Supreme Court of Missouri had seen in the case a problem of proximate
cause, 34 but on the facts as viewed on appeal by the United States Supreme
Court, this issue was not presented. The Rogers case, however, has a significance
beyond its liberal rule of causation in fact. This importance lies in the approach of
30 See Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 507, 508 (1957).
31See Prosser, PalsgrafRevisited, 52 MicH. L. REv. 1, 24 (1953).
32 See GntN, RATONALE OF PomIMATE CAUsE 36, 122-27 (1927); McLaughlin,

Proximate Cause, 39 HAiv. L. REv. 149; Edgerton, Legal Cause, 72 U. PA. L. REv. 343,
348 (1924).
33 352 U.S. 500 (1957).
3
4Rogers v. Thompson, 284 S.W.2d 467, 472 (Mo. 1955).
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the Court toward the entire theory of laibility under the FELA. The opinion
makes it clear that the Court regards this as a special statutory liability, distinct
from liability for negligence at common law. Liberal standards of recovery had
long obtained in Jones Act and FELA cases, but this had been accomplished within

5
the framework of common law negligence concepts.3 In the Rogers case the FELA,

and with it the Jones Act, cast off from its common law moorings and set an
independent course, guided not by the ancient hand of the common law, but by
the commands of a Supreme Court anxious to secure compensation whenever
possible to the victims of industrial accidents.
What are the incidents of this new liability? Simplicity is to be its keystone.
Only negligence itself remains substantially in its common law form, retaining the
element of reasonable foreseeability of harm sufficiently grave to outweigh the
utility of the defendant's conduct, 6 and even this issue must be handed to the
jury if supported by a scintilla of evidence.3 7 Given employer fault, the path to
recovery is to be kept uncluttered. Swept aside are the common law formulae for
determining causation, and in their place is a rule defining the defendant's negligence as a cause if it played any part at all in the plaintiff's injury.
With guidelines such as these it is small wonder that lower courts have
viewed the Rogers case as requiring a relaxation of some of the common law
standards of proximate cause.38 But which of the common law guidelines must
go, and with what are they to be replaced? These questions were left unanswered
by the Rogers case because they were not presented.
In Kernan v. American Dredging Co.3 9 the United States Supreme Court
demolished one well-established common law rule for limiting liability, and, by
way of dictum, raised the specter that there may be no limitation at all. This was
a Jones Act case involving the violation of a statute. At common law the problem
of limiting the defendant's liability is easiest when negligence is predicated on
such a violation. The courts look simply to the purpose of the statute violated by
the defendant. If the harm caused to the plaintiff is found to be of a character
against which the legislation was designed to protect, they look no further.40 The
statute both qualifies the act of the defendant as negligent and sets tightly the
bounds of his liability. The written law which usually reveals the purpose of the
statute without great difficulty, and the well-settled policy of strict construction
have been said4l to set this rule apart from any court-made rule for limiting the
actor's liability when no statute is involved. The basic problem, however, is the
same, though the solution is much easier when there is a statute.
In the Kernan case the Supreme Court held this test of statutory purpose inapplicable to Jones Act cases. The owner of a tug had violated a Coast Guard
35 See, e.g., Swmson v. Chicago, St. Paul, M. & 0. Ry., 294 U.S. 529, 531 (1935).
3
6 Kuberski v. New York Cent. R.R., 359 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1966); Dangovich

v.

Isthiman Lines, 327 F.2d 355, 1964 A.M.C. 629 (2d Cir. 1964); Gwmett v. Albatross
S.S. Co., 243 F.2d 8, 1957 A.M.C. 980 (2d Cir. 1957).
37 Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 352 U.S. 521, 1957 A.M.C. 647 (1957).
38 See, e.g., Ammar v. American Export Lines, 326 F.2d 955, 1964 A.M.C. 631 (2d
Cir. 1964).
39 355 U.S. 426, 1958 A.M.C. 251 (1958).
40 See PRossEr § 35, at 196-97.
41 Prosser, PalsgrafRevisited, 52 Mica. L. REv. 1, 15-16 (1953). Compare GBEEZ,
RATioNALE oF PToxnmfAE CAUsE 27-28 (1927).
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regulation requiring the maintenance of a white light not less than eight feet
above the water. The tug carried instead an open flame lamp at a height of only
three feet. Upon the surface there lay an accumulation of waste petroleum products
which the owner had no reason to expect; these were ignited by the flame from the
lamp, and m the ensuing fire a seaman died on board the tug. The court declined
to find a broad safety purpose in the statute for the protection of seamen to bring
it within the common law rule.42 It conceded that the only purpose of the regulation was the prevention of collisions, but held this to be immaterial. The act done
in violation of statute caused the death, and this was enough to create liability.
The Kernan decision was frankly one of policy. The Court expanded on the
Rogers theme that liability under the Jones Act and the FELA is distinct from
ordinary negligence liability at common law. Congress, by not defining in detail the
standards to apply in these special statutory actions, had left the courts free to
adjust these standards to "meet changing conditions and changing concepts of
industry's duty toward its workers." 43 Under prevailing industrial conditions
and modem concepts of the distribution of risks inherent in these conditions, the
old test of statutory purpose was held to be out of place.
Mr. Justice Brennan, for the majority, then moved beyond the immediate
problem of violation of statute, and summarized his view of liability under the
Jones Act and the FELA in the following language:
The theory of FELA is that where the employer's conduct falls short of the high
standard required of him by this Act, and his fault, in whole or in part, causes
injury, liability ensues. And this result follows whether the fault is a violation of a
4
statutory duty or the more general duty of acting with care
This language certainly indicates a departure from the limits which the common
law has sought to place on the liability of negligent defendants. It is so broad,
however, that it reveals little more. Given its literal effect, it would mean that
there are no longer any limits at all and that the employer is to be liable for all
injuries in wich some breach of duty, statutory or otherwise, plays even the
slightest part. It has not been given this effect in subsequent cases. Liability has
in fact been limited to consequences not too extraordinary in light of the risk
created by the employer. 45 Even when there has been a violation of statute, the
employer has been relieved of liability where harm has followed not directly and
immediately, but through a series of strange and unrelated events.46
42 355 U.S. at 429, 1958 A.M.C. at 255.
4
3Id. at 432, 1958 A.M.C. at 255.
-4 Id. at 438-39, 1958 A.M.C. at 261-62.
45
Simpson v. Texas & N.O.R.R., 297 F.2d 660 (5th Cir. 1962); Nicholson v. Erie
R.R., 253 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1958); Tweedy v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 190 F Supp. 437,
1961 A.M.C. 1829 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), ayd, 290 F.2d 921, 1961 A.M.C. 2329 (2d Cir.
1961) (alternative holding); Reed v. Pennsylvama R.R., 171 Oho St. 433, 171 N.E.2d
718 (1961),
cert. denied, 366 U.S. 936 (1961).
46
5See Reed v. Pennsylvama R.R., 177 Ohio St. 433, 171 N.E.2d 718 (1961), cert.
denied, 366 U.S. 936 (1961), where a tram was brought to a halt because of defective
brakes, a violation of the Safety Appliance Act, 27 Stat. 531 (1893), as amended, 45
U.S.C. §§ 22-34 (1964). The engineer remained in the cab for forty-five minutes while
repairs were made, and then received a call from an operator at a nearby station.
Unable to achieve good communications on the cab's radio, he decided to leave the
tram to use a nearby telephone. While climbing out of the cab, he fell and was injured.
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Once it is admitted that liability is to be limited short of causation in fact,
neither the Rogers rule of causation nor the expansive language of Kernan can be
of much value in determining where the bounds of that liability are to be set.
One can only look to decisions since Rogers to see where the courts have tended to
draw the line.
Direct Consequences
Results are said to be "direct" when they flow from the application of the
defendant's negligence to circumstances existing at the time and place of his
act.47 When some external force, human or otherwise, materializes after his act
and changes the situation he has created, the results are no longer direct.
When results are direct, the common law has long been torn between two
opposing views. One would hold, in effect, that all direct results are "proximate," 48
on the theory that this very directness establishes a sufficient relation between the
injury and the conduct producing it to justify holding the defendant liable. The
other view would limit the defendant's liability to the "foreseeable" consequences
of his negligence, 49 making the tests of negligence and proximate cause substantially the same. This limitation actually has two branches: foreseeability of the
particular plaintiff who has been injured and foreseeability of the result which has
befallen hun. The former is largely the product of Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R., 0
in which Judge Cardozo held that unless the defendant could foresee that his
conduct involved the risk of some injury to the plaintiff, he violated no duty owed
to the plaintiff, and thus as to this individual he was not negligent. If Cardozo's
position is accepted, the other branch of the limitation, requiring that the results
of the defendant's negligence be foreseeable, should follow.51
While foreseeability, in both of its branches, has been gaining ground as the
criterion of proximate cause at common law,52 the trend in FELA and Jones Act
cases appears to be in the other direction. With respect to foreseeability of the
plaintiff, no Jones Act case has been found adhering to the Palsgraf position. A
few older FELA cases 53 utilized Palsgraf to defeat recovery by railroad workers,
but these cases have been criticized 54 and it is doubtful whether they have any
The court held this injury entirely too remote from the employer's violation of the
Safety Appliance Act. See also Coray v. Southern Pac. Co., 335 U.S. 520 (1949) involving a more direct, though unusual, result. In Holloway v. Butler, 1960 A.M.C. 202 (S.D.
Fla. 1959), an employee, relying on Kernan, sought to invoke a nuisance ordinance of
the city of Smira Beach, Florida. His purpose is not made clear in the brief report
of the case, but the court had little sympathy with the attempt. Noting that Kernan
was a Jones Act case, the court dismissed it as "dictum." Compare Marshall v. Isthmian
Lines, 334 F.2d 131, 1964 A.M.C. 1686 (5th Cir. 1964) (longshoreman's negligence
action).
47
McLaughlin, Proximate Cause, 39 HAiv. L. Bxv 149, 163 (1925).
48 See, e.g., In re Polemis & Fumess, Withy & Co., [19211 3 K B. 560.
49 See, e.g., Mauney v. Gulf Refining Co., 193 Miss. 421, 9 So. 2d 780 (1942).
50 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
51 See Prosser, Proximate Cause in California, 38 CALIF. L. REv. 369, 399 (1950).
5

2 PRossEa § 50, at 305-06.

5

3 Karr v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry, 341 Mo. 536, 108 S.W.2d 44, 48-49 (1937);

Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Murray, 40 Wyo. 324, 328, 277 Pac. 703, 709 (1929).
54 Ehrenzweig, Loss-Shifting and Quasi Negligence: A New Interpretation of the
PaIsgraf Case, 8 U. Cmi. L. REv. 729, 741 (1941).
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present vitality. On the other hand, recovery has been allowed under the FELA
since Rogers even though the plaintiff was apparently beyond the zone of any
foreseeable danger created by the defendant. 55 In the area of results as well,
foreseeability seems to be out of fashion as a device for limiting the liability of the
negligent employer. In a number of cases since Rogers, jury instructions containing the conventional "natural and probable" formula have been held erroneous,
along with those embodying the traditional test of causation in fact.5 6 The entire
tenor of the Supreme Court's opinion in the Kernan case makes unlikely a "foreseeability" limitation on the employer's liability, at least when the results of his negligence are direct.
It is most probable that the alternative view, which imposes liability for all
direct consequences, will gain general acceptance. This is strongly indicated by
Gallick v. Baltimore & O.R.R.,5t which involved a railway employee who was
bitten by an insect from his employer's stagnant pond, and as a result lost both of
his legs. In response to special interrogatories the jury found negligence and
causation, but also found that no injury to the plaintiff could have been foreseen by
the defendant. Since this last response appeared irreconcilable with the finding
of negligence, the Court interpreted it to mean that the insect bite was foreseeable,
while the severe consequences were not. The Court went on to hold the defendant
liable for these consequences.
Once the jury's responses had been harmonized in this manner, the case is
comparable with In re Polemrs,58 the famous English case of direct causation where
the defendant's servants negligently dropped a board into the hold of a ship,
exposing the cargo to some damage. The board when it fell touched off a spark
which resulted in the loss of the vessel by fire. The defendant was held liable for
this totally unforeseeable result on the ground that it flowed directly from his negligence. The difficulty with the analogy between Polemzs and Galliclc, however, is
that the latter involved a special situation-the unforeseeable consequences of a
negligent impact on the person of the plaintiff. This is a situation in which all
courts, even those committed to the foreseeability limitation, find liability. 59 Thus
the Court, in holding the employer liable, relied primarily on common law authorities. Its decision was bolstered, however, by the following language:
[We have no doubt that under a statute where the tortfeasor is liable for death or
55
55

See Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Cam, 175 So. 2d 561 (Fla. App. 1965).
See Page v. St. Loius Southwestern By., 312 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1963); DeLuna
v. Trnidad Corp., 302 F.2d 585, 1962 A.M.C. 2346 (2d Cir. 1962); Hoyt v. Central
R.R., 243 F.2d 840 (3d Cir. 1957).
57372 U.S. 108 (1963).
5
8In re Polems & Furness, Withy & Co., [1921j 3 K.B. 560, overruled in the
United Kingdom by Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng. Co. [1961]
A.C. 388 (P.C.) (N.S.W.).
59
Larson v. Boston Elevated R.R., 212 Mass. 262, 98 N.E. 1048 (1912); Turner
v. Minneapolis St. Ry., 140 Minn. 248, 167 N.W 1041 (1918); Ommsky v. Charles
Wemhagen & Co., 113 Minn. 422, 129 N.W 845 (1911); Keegan v. Minneapolis &
St. Louis R.R., 76 Minn. 90, 78 N.W 965 (1899); McCahill v. New York Transp. Co.,
201 N.Y. 221, 94 N.E. 616 (1911); Prosser, Proximate Cause in California,38 CALF. L.
REv. 369, 394-95 (1950). See Possiza § 50, at 300: "It is as if a magic circle were drawn
about the person, and one who breaks it, even by so much as a cut on the finger,
becomes liable for all resulting harm to the person, although it may be death."

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. is

injuries in producing which his "negligence played any part, even the slightest"
such a tortfeasor must compensate his victim for even the improbable or
unexpectedly severe consequences of his wrongful act.60
Tins statement seems to indicate that the concept of direct causation, which
extends the liability of the negligent defendant beyond foreseeability, will ultimately prevail in FELA and Jones Act cases.
Intervening Causes
As long as consequences are direct, without the intervention of a third person,
or a force of nature, it is quite possible to lay aside foreseeability as a test of the
proximate. This is because the defendant's liability is limited by the situation
existing at the time and place of his act. Tis situation can remain unchanged for
only so long. Thus, the possible results of the defendant's conduct, while they
may be very great, are not unlimited.
When there are intervening causes, however, the possibilities are literally
infinite. Here, the courts, as a rule of necessity, have been forced to apply a
foreseeability limitation on liability.61 Thus, at common law and under the Jones
Act 6 2 in the past, the general rule has been that unforeseeable intervening causes
supersede the defendant's negligence and relieve him of liability. It is in this
area that it is most difficult to discern the extent to which there has been a departure from common law guidelines in Jones Act and FELA cases since Rogers.
This difficulty is due in large measure to the fact that there are various types of
intervening causes, and on some of these the common law policy is far from clear.
It is therefore necessary to examine each of these separately.
Foreseeable intervening causes are no problem. They are part of the risk
created by the defendant's negligence, and courts, both at common law 63 and
under the Jones Act,6 4 have no difficulty in holding him liable. At one point in
the history of the common law the idea gained favor that the intervening negligence
of a tird person, even if foreseeable, relieved the original wrongdoer of liability.
Tins doctrine of the "last human wrongdoer" is now largely a matter of history
and it is now generally agreed that such negligence, and even criminal misconduct,
60 372 U.S. at 120-21.
61 See McLaughlin, Proximate Cause, 39 HARv. L. REv. 149, 183 (1925).
62 Repsholdt v. United States, 205 F.2d 852, 1953 A.M.C. 1416 (7th Cir. 1953)
(semble); Naylor v. Isthimam S.S. Co., 187 F.2d 538, 1951 A.M.C. 632 (2d Cir. 1951)
(by implication); Jackson v. Pittsburg S.S. Co., 131 F.2d 668, 1943 A.M.C. 885 (6th
Cir. 1942); Lorang v. Alaska S.S. Co., 2 F.2d 300, 1924 A.M.C. 1240 (W.D. Wash.
1924).6
3 E.g., Benedict Pineapple Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 55 Fla. 514, 46 So.
732 (1908); Fox v. Boston & Maine R.R., 148 Mass. 220, 19 N.E. 222 (1889); Kimble v.
Mackintosh Hemphill Co., 359 Pa. 461, 59 A.2d 68 (1948); see PFossEu § 51, at 311-14.
64 See Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500 (1957) (self defensive effort
to escape treated as foreseeable); Superior Oil Co. v. Trahan, 322 F.2d 234, 1964 A.M.C.
100 (5th Cir. 1963); Menefee v. W.R. Chamberlin Co., 176 F.2d 828, 1950 A.M.C.
1325 (9th Cir. 1949); Tate v. C. G. Willis Co., 154 F Supp. 402, 1957 A.M.C. 1859
(E.D. Va. 1957); Allen v. Oceanside Lumber Co., 214 Ore. 27, 328 P.2d 327 (1958).
See also Giambrone v. Israel America Line, 26 Misc. 2d 593, 208 N.Y.S.2d 215 (1960)
(longshoreman's action for unseaworthness).
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may be part of the risk to which the defendant exposed the plaintiff, and does not
affect his liability.6 5 In an occasional Jones Act case 66 a shipowner exhumes the
old theory and the court recites from the Rogers case to show that it has no place
in the Jones Act. The reliance on Rogers is unnecessary; the old doctrine has
little vitality anywhere.
After foreseeable intervening causes come those which have been characterized
as "normal" intervening causes. 67 When the defendant endangers another he is
commonly held liable for injuries suffered by his victim while seeking to escape, s
and by his victim's rescuer.6 9 When he has negligently inflicted an injury on the
plaintiff, his liability often extends to subsequent injuries sustained by the plaintiff
as a result of the original harm. 70 These things are not really foreseeable in the
sense that the defendant could be expected to have had them in mind at the time

of his conduct, and thus they cannot be considered part of the risk that made hum
negligent. 71 They are, however, so normal to the situation he has created that
they do not relieve hn of liability. Rogers v. Missouri Fac. R.R. 72 was itself such
a case. The plaintiff was required by his duties to stand close to passing trams in
the vicinity of burning brush. A speeding tram fanned the flames in his direction,
and in seeking to escape he fell into a culvert. On this point the U. S. Supreme
Court declared no departure from the common law.73 Self-defensive efforts to
escape are considered normal to the emergency created by the defendant.
Ammar v. American Export Lines74 involved the problem of a second injury

The plaintiff fell from a platform while working on board sip, suffering severe
head injuries which resulted in recurrent "blackouts." Twenty months after the
original injury the plaintiff had a blackout and lost consciousness while trying out
a fiend's motorcycle. The motorcycle hit a wall, and the plaintiff was grievously
injured. The employer was held liable for the subsequent injuries. The court
relied heavily on the "liberal guide lines" established by the Rogers case. These
0S Eldredge, Culpable Intervention as Superseding Cause, 86 U. PA. L. Rxv. 121,
125 (1937).
66E.g., Allen v. Oceanside Lumber Co., 214 Ore. 27, 328 P.2d 327 (1958).
67
Prosser, Proximate Cause in California, 38 CALIF. L. R-v. 369, 404-06 (1950).
68 E.g., Tuttle v. Atlantic City R.R., 66 N.J.L. 327, 49 Ad. 450 (1901).
6
9 Wagner v. International By., 232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437 (1921). An older Jones
Act case indicating some of the limitations on the rescue doctrine is Santie v. Mesech
Steamboat Co., 41 F Supp. 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). Plaintiff, a bartender on board defen-

dant's passenger ship, noticed a small fire

in

a cabin. He picked up a fire extinguisher

and raced into the room, where he immediately panicked at the sight of the flames and
smoke. Instead of departing by the door through which he has just entered, he ran
across the room and put his hand through a port hole, cutting himself severely. The court
held that the defendant's employees were not negligent in starting the fire, but even
if they had been, plaintiff could not recover.
70 E.g., Squires v. Reynolds, 125 Conn. 366, 5 A.2d 877 (1939).
71
Prosser, Proximate Cause in California, 38 CALIw. L. Bxv. 369, 404 (1950).
72 352 U.S. 500 (1957).
73
Actually the Court viewed the self defensive effort of Rogers as foreseeable, and
thus part of the risk created by the foreman who assigned him the two duties. The result
is the same as if the effort to escape had been regarded as a "normal," though unforeseeable, intervening cause. See Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 502 (1957).
74 326 F.2d 955, 1964 A.M.C. 631 (2d Cir. 1964).
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"the application of causation analysis to limit liability for
were said to preclude
75
remote damages."
How great a departure is the Ammar case from the common law? Contributory
negligence aside, it is very likely that at common law the plaintiffs conduct, in
riding a motorcycle when he knew he was subject to blackouts, would be held to
remove his second injury from the realm of the "normal."76 But this is by no means
certain. Like so many other questions of proximate cause, it would depend on the
court, and perhaps on the jury. And who can say what the Ammar court would
have done if twenty years rather than twenty months had passed, or if instead of
riding a motorcycle Ammar had committed suicide in despair at the prospect of
lifelong blackouts?77 The case does go quite far, and at least it indicates that under
the Jones Act, since Rogers, more remote hazards of this type may be regarded as
"normal."
The final group of intervening causes to be considered are those which are
neither foreseeable nor normal to the risk created by the defendant. Here the
general rule, both at common law78 and under the Jones Act,79 has been that the
defendant is relieved of liability. This rule is subject to the qualification that if the
result is itself foreseeable from the defendant's negligence he is not relieved of
liability by the unforeseeability of the intervening cause which brought it about.80
Since the Rogers case, foreseeability has apparently fallen from favor as a test
of proximate cause in Jones Act cases. This has already been noted in the area of
direct results, but it appears to hold true even when there are intervening causes.
Certainly it is no longer a factor for the jury to consider; under the frequently
approved instruction the jury determines only negligence and causation in fact.81
Nor is there any indication that the court uses "foreseeability" as the sole criterion
of proximate cause. The term is rarely mentioned. Where, then, does the employer's liability stop under the FELA and the Jones Act? The cases, which are few
in number, reveal only that his liability is limited far short of causation in fact.
In one FELA case, 82 for example, the defendant supplied its messenger with a
defective motorcycle which broke down during his rounds, forcing him to resort
Id. at 959, 1964 A.M.C. at 635.
76 See Sporna v. Kalina, 184 Minn. 89, 237 N.W 841 (1931).
77 See McMahon v. City of New York, 16 Misc. 2d 143, 141 N.Y.S.2d 190 (1955).
78Gerber v. McCall, 175 Kan. 433, 264 P.2d 490 (1953); Berry v. Sugar Notch
Borough, 191 Pa. 345, 43 At. 240 (1899); Doss v. Town of Big Stone Gap, 145 Va.
520, 134 S.E. 563 (1926); Burlie v. Stephens, 113 Wash. 182, 193 Pac. 684 (1920). See
PnossEn § 51, at 320-25.
79 Cases cited note 62 supra.
80 Johnson v. Kosmos Portland Cement Co., 64 F.2d 193 (6th Cir. 1933); Gibson
v. Garcia, 96 Cal. App. 2d 681, 216 P.2d 119 (1950). This principle has been recognized
in Jones Act cases. See Helinke v. United States, 8 F Supp. 621 (E.D. La. 1934)
(unforeseeable dog bringing about foreseeable result); Monterrosa v. Grace Line, Inc.,
90 Cal. App. 2d 826, 204 P.2d 377 (1949).
81 See Ammar v. American Export Co., 326 F.2d 955, 1964 A.M.C. 631 (2d Cir.
1964); Page v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry., 312 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1963); DeLima v.
Trinidad Corp., 302 F.2d 585, 1962 A.M.C. 2346 (2d Cir. 1962); Continental Oil Co.
v. Lindley, 382 S.W.2d 296, 1965 A.M.C. 989 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964); Missoun-Kan.-Tex.
R.R. v. Shelton, 383 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964); Mathes, Jury Instructions &
Forms for Federal Civil Cases, 28 F.R.D. 401, 497 (1962).
82 Simpson v. Texas & N.O.R.R., 297 F.2d 660 (5th Cir. 1962).
75
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to public transportation. After alighting from the bus he was struck by an automobile while crossing a street. The plaintiff stressed the Rogers rule of causation,
but causation would appear to be present by any formula; had the motorcycle been
properly maintained the plaintiff would not have taken the bus, and would never
have been in the path of the car that hit him. The court, however, said that the
"causal connection" between negligence and injury was "broken" by this sequence
of events. 88 In another case s - a railroad failed to supply a restroom for the employees of its station cafeteria. The plaintiff was thus required to use the facilities
of a railroad car, and after doing so she was knocked down and injured by a
passenger on board the car. This injury was held "too far removed both in space and
time" 85 from the employer's omission to provide a restroom, and there was no
liability.
It may be thought that in these cases no injury could have been anticipated
from the employer's conduct, and therefore he was not negligent at all. In each
ease, however, the court recogmzed that under the liberal rules established by
Rogers the plaintiff had made out a jury case of negligence. However, negligence
and causation were not enough. What happened to the plaintiff was so remote,
so unrelated in time, space or probability to any harm threatened by the defendant
that one feels almost instinctively that to hold the employer liable would be going
too far.8 6 Cases like these bring home the point that the FELA recovery is still
based upon negligence. The standards of recovery may be very liberal, but liability
must be traced to a wrong on the employer's part. As long as this is true, it is very
likely that courts will be unable to ignore completely the relation between that
wrong and the harm it causes.
Shifting Responsibility
Superseding causes are not the only devices by which at common law a negligent defendant may be relieved of liability by subsequent events. In certain cases
the conduct of a third person, or of the plaintiff himself, may be such that responsibility "shift" from the defendant.8 7 The most inportant difference between
this concept and that of superseding cause is that the conduct of the third person
may be perfectly foreseeable, and yet it permits the defendant to avoid responsibility.8 8 The principal ingredient of shifting responsibility appears to be an element
to exploit or disregard the danger
of conscious choice on the part of a third person
89
of the situation created by the defendant.
This concept is not unknown to admiralty courts. In The Lusitanta9 ° a steamship company ignored repeated warning from the German government that the
ship would be sunk if she ventured into forbidden waters. The Germans made
good their threat and sent the Lusitama to the bottom along with many of her
passengers. Although it was negligent for the company to proceed with the voyage
Id. at 662.
Nicholson v. Ere R.R., 253 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1958).
85 Id. at 941.
86 Cf. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 Mic. L. R-Ev. 1, 30-32 (1953).
87
See, e.g., Pittsburg Reduction Co. v. Horton, 87 Ark. 576, 113 S.W 647 (1908).
88
Prosser, Proximate Cause in California,38 CAr.U. L. B-v. 369, 409 n.192 (1950).
89 Ibid.
00 251 Fed. 715 (S.D.N.Y. 1918).
83
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under these circumstances, it was relieved of liability by the wilful act of a
foreign power. 91
The principle of shifting responsibility was apparently applied in a fairly recent
Jones Act case, Myles v. Quinn Menhaden Fisheries.9 2 An itinerant fisherman was
returning to Ins employer's fishing boat after a night of drinking. The customary
means of ingress to the boats was through an unlighted spur track. The fisherman
fell asleep on the tracks, and a train amputated both his legs. After reaching a
settlement with the railroad, he sued is employer in admiralty, alleging failure
to provide a safe means of ingress. Emphasizing the quality of the railroad's conduct in continually backing unlighted trams into the darkness after it knew of
the use of the spur track by seamen, the court held that this, and not any
93
employer negligence, was "the proximate cause" of the injury.
Concluston
The history of the Jones Act may be viewed as a continuing struggle on the
part of the courts to liberalize the standards of recovery under a statute predicating
liability on negligence. The modem high point in this struggle came in the
Rogers case, where the United States Supreme Court banished from the FELA
and the Jones Act some of the most familiar incidents of negligence liability at
common law. The seaman who elects to bring hIs action at law may now have a
jury trial on the issues of negligence and causation with even the slightest evidence,
and in most courts he has the benefit of an instruction permitting the jury to find
causation present if the employer's negligence made the slightest contribution to
his injury. These are fundamental departures from the common law; their import
lies in the fact that in the ordinary case, where the conduct in question clearly
exposed the employee to the very hazard which has occurred, he can recover
almost as a matter of course. He must prove negligence, but once he has done so,
causation is rarely a problem.
Not all cases, however, are "ordinary." When the employer's negligence
threatens the plaintiff with a different peril than that wuch it has actually caused,
there is a problem of proximate cause. Here the Jones Act waters are troubled
91
See also The Mars, 9 F.2d 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1914), where a tug negligently collided with a barge, holing her side. The crew of the barge continued to load her until
the hole in the hull was submerged, and the barge sank. The tug was not held liable
for the loss of the barge. The case is discussed in GipxN, RAioNALE oF Paoxnv aw

CAusE 153 (1927).
92

302 F.2d 146, 1962 A.M.C. 1626 (5th Cir. 1962).

See also Inman v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 361 U.S. 138 (1959), where a railroad
flagman alleged that the defendant negligently assigned him multiple duties at a busy
intersection, causing him to be injured by a drunken driver. In a five to four decision,
the Supreme Court held that, even under liberal FELA rules, plaintiff had not made out
a jury case of negligence. Although the express ground of decision was lack of proof
on the negligence issue, the majority stressed the intoxication and recklessness of the
driver. In In re Atlass' Petition, 350 F.2d 592 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
988 (1965), the court indicated that willful intoxication or other serious misconduct on
the part of the injured seaman may permit the negligent employer to avoid responsibility.
Cf. Memtsma v. United States, 164 F.2d 976 (9th Cir. 1947); Colban v. Petterson
Lighterage &Towing Corp., 24 A.D.2d 870, 264 N.Y.S.2d 403, 1966 A.M.C. 365 (App.
Div. 1965).
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